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The Questionable Utility of Copyright Notice:
Statutory and Nonlegal Incentives in the
Post-Berne Era
Thomas P. Arden*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Any American who has picked up a book to read or a product to
use is familiar with the notice of a claim of copyright. The ubiquitous copyright symbol, accompanied by a date and name, is seen
on such disparate items as advertisements, computer chips, maps,
and television programs.
For over three years, however, United States copyright law has
not required a notice of copyright to preserve rights in a work. In
order to join the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention"),' the United States had
to eliminate the notice requirement as well as make other, less significant changes to the Copyright Act.2 The Berne Convention,
which the United States finally joined on March 1, 1989, in order
to secure greater international protection of U.S. works,3 requires
* Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson, Chicago, Illinois. B.A.,
Cornell University, 1981; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985. The author thanks his colleague
Mary E. Innis, as well as John W. Arden, Jr., and Mary Gasca, for valuable insight and
ideas.
1. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1972) (as amended). [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Berne
Convention was first signed on September 9, 1886, and entered into force on December 5,
1887. It has been subject to five revisions: 1908 Berlin Act, 1928 Rome Act, 1948 Brussels Act, 1967 Stockholm Act, and 1971 Paris Act. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12-13 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 609]. The United States adhered to the
Paris text of the Convention. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). The text of the
Berne Convention signed at Paris is reprinted in 5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 27 (1992) [hereinafter NIMMER].
2. For comprehensive discussions of these other changes, see Jane C. Ginsburg &
John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1988) [hereinafter Ginsburg & Kernochan];
David M. Spector, Implications of United States Adherence to the Berne Convention, 17
AIPLA Q.J. 100 (1989) [hereinafter Spector].
3. See generally Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation of the 1886
Berne Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171 (1989) [hereinafter Hatch]; Doraine
Lambelet, Note, Internationalizingthe Copyright Code: An Analysis of Legislative Proposals Seeking Adherence to the Berne Convention, 76 GEO. L.J. 467, 470-73 (1987) [hereinafter InternationalizingCopyright].
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all member nations to refrain from conditioning protection upon
compliance with formalities, such as including a copyright notice
on published works.
Despite eliminating the notice requirement, Congress, in the
Berne Convention Implementation Act ("BCIA"),5 retained the
technical provisions governing use of a copyright notice.6 After
concluding that the tradition of using a notice should be encouraged, Congress included an amendment providing that an infringer with access to a work containing a proper notice cannot
claim innocent infringement to mitigate actual or statutory damages. 7 Because of this new incentive, authorities have generally
recommended the continued use of the statutorily prescribed copyright notice."
This Article questions the assumption that the statutory copyright notice should be of continued utility for the great majority of
works governed by the provisions of the BCIA. It will first discuss
the former notice requirement and other statutory provisions pertaining to the use of a notice. It will then analyze the amendments
to these provisions and the ambiguities resulting from the imprecise language Congress used in creating the incentive to use a notice. This Article will also identify legal provisions outside of the
Copyright Act that may be implicated through use of a copyright
notice.
This Article will then explore the net effect that surviving legal
principles should have in providing an incentive to continue using
the traditional copyright notice. It will also explore the nonlegal
considerations usually offered in support of using a notice. This
Article will conclude that the existing legal incentives should do
little to promote the continued use of the statutory notice, and that
the surviving nonlegal benefits are limited for most authors and
4. Berne Convention, supra note 1, at art. 5(2).
5. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
6. Six sections of the Act are devoted to use of a copyright notice. 17 U.S.C. §§ 40106 (1992). Four of the six sections are still applicable to works published after March 1,
1989; two (§§ 404-05) were retained simply to be consulted for works first published
before March 1, 1989.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 401(d) (1992).
8. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.02[C][3] (1992); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.5.1 (1989) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN]; Spector,
supra note 2, at 118-19; William A. Tanenbaum, An Analysis and Guide to the Berne
Convention Implementation Act: Amendments to the United States Copyright Act, 13
HAMLINE L. REV. 253, 260-62 (1990); see also InternationalizingCopyright, supra note 3,
at 501 (arguing that while "notice would technically be voluntary, effectively it would
not" if an evidentiary incentive applied).
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largely attainable without having to resort to the form of notice
still prescribed by the Copyright Act.
II.

THE FORMER COPYRIGHT NOTICE PROVISIONS

A.

Preservationof Rights

For more than two hundred years, under U.S. law an author had
to use a copyright notice upon publication of his or her work or
lose all rights in the work. 9 This provision entailed technical requirements relating to the proper form, content, and placement of
the notice. The Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act"),' 0 as well as
previous acts, '' required the following elements: (1) the symbol ©,
the word Copyright, or the abbreviation Copr.; (2) the date of first
publication; and (3) the name of the copyright owner.' 2 The notice had to be placed 3in a manner giving "reasonable notice of the
claim of copyright."'

The technical provisions governing notice gave rise to substantial litigation and led to a whole body of law dealing with the use of
copyright notice.' 4 For example, because a copyright notice was
required only when "publication" occurred, numerous cases were
decided defining publication.' Courts also established new doc9. In the words of the House Report, the BCIA dispensed with "a device that has
been statutorily required for nearly two centuries to identify works under copyright after
publication." H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 1, at 45 & n.106 (citing Act of 1790, ch. 15,
1 Stat. 124).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1978).
11. The 1909 Act contained a similar notice requirement. 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1977). In
discussing the background of copyright notice requirements, this Article will refer principally to the 1976 Act, which the BCIA amended.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1978). For phonorecords and sound recordings, the 1976 Act
required essentially the same elements except that the encircled letter P had to be used.
Id. § 402(b). This Article will refer to the form of copyright notice applicable to works
other than phonorecords and sound recordings.
13. Id. § 401(c). The Act gave the Register of Copyrights authority to prescribe
methods of placement on different types of works, but provided that these regulations
would not be exhaustive. Id. The Copyright Act of 1909, §§ 19-20, itself contained technical requirements on placement; for example, in the case of books, the copyright notice
was to be applied "upon its title page or the page immediately following." 17 U.S.C.
§§ 19-20 (1977).
14. The treatise Nimmer on Copyright devotes 135 pages to the area. 2 NIMMER,
supra note 1, §§ 7.02-7.15. Chapter 1000 of THE COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES 11 (1984) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM] contains 58 provisions on notice. The
West Publishing Company Digest for the copyright area contains four separate sections
covering the notice requirement. 25 WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST 4TH, Copyrights & Intell. Prop. §§ 50.1-50.6 (1990).
15. Cases focused on a judicially created distinction between a "limited" and a "general" publication, whereby only the latter required copyright notice. See Data Cash Sys.,
Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (7th Cir. 1980); White v. Kimmell,
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trines resolving questions such as when and to what extent a copyright notice on one part of a multipart work was sufficient 1 6 and
what notations were sufficient to satisfy the provision requiring the
name of the copyright owner.17
The law concerning copyright notice was inconsistent 8 and led
to harsh results for failure to include a copyright notice 9 or the
proper form of the notice.20 Some courts, most notably in the Second Circuit, occasionally ignored or manipulated the statute to
preserve copyrights in works on which notice was difficult to
place 21 and where infringement appeared willful. 22
193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952); Letter Edged in Black
Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
16. Under the "unit publication" doctrine, not every piece of a multipiece work need
be marked with a copyright notice. If all pieces are used and sold together, notice on one
piece is sufficient. See Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 1281,
1284-85 (6th Cir. 1974); Patterson v. Century Prods., 93 F.2d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 1937);
Koontz v. Jaffarian, 617 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 906, 909
(4th Cir. 1986).
17. Under the 1909 Act, a notice for pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works could
contain the initial, monogram, mark or symbol of the copyright owner if the owner's full
name was placed elsewhere on the work. 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1977). Courts also accepted the
use of initials or abbreviations on other works if they effectively identified the copyright
owner. See Harry Alter Co. v. Graves Refrigerator, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 703, 704 (N.D.
Ga. 1951); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, § 3.6.1.b. Under § 401(b)(3) of the 1976 Act, "an
abbreviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative
designation of the owner" is allowed. Authorities have disagreed on whether the use of
an owner's initials is sufficient under this provision. Compare 2 NIMMER, supra note 1,
§ 7.09[B] (stating that "[i]n most cases a notice which contains the owner's initials but
not his name is defective") with GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, § 3.6.1.3.a (stating that Congress, in adopting § 401(b)(3), "intended to follow decisions under the 1909 Act authorizing the use of the copyright owner's initials, trademark or other identifying insignia").
18. For example, conflicts arose concerning whether filing a work with a state regulatory agency constituted publication requiring notice. Compare, e.g., The Progressive
Corp. v. Integon P&C Corp., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682, 1685-86 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the filing of a rate manual with a state insurance bureau constituted publication)
with East/West Venture v. Wurmfeld Ass'n, P.C., 722 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding that the filing of architectural plans with a zoning and planning board was
not a publication) and WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enter., 584 F. Supp. 132, 136 (D.D.C.
1984) (holding that the filing of an engineering report with the FCC was not a publication); see also supra note 17.
19. See DeJonge & Co. v. Brueker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1914); Cooling
Sys. & Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator Co., 777 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1985); Data Cash
Sys., Inc., 628 F.2d at 1043-44; J.A. Richards, Inc. v. New York Post, Inc., 23 F. Supp.
619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
20. See Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260, 264 (1903). The Court rejected a
claim that "any form of notice is good which calls attention to the person of whom inquiry can be made and information obtained," because "the right being purely statutory,
the public may justly demand that the person claiming a monopoly of publication shall
pursue, in substance at least, the statutory method of securing it." Id.
21. In Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir.
1960), Judge Learned Hand held that notice for a fabric design stamped on the selvage of
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In an attempt to remove some of the harsh effects of the notice
requirement, 23 in the 1976 Act Congress enacted ameliorative
"cure" provisions by which an author could rectify any initial
omission of notice within a five-year period.24 In many cases, however, these provisions failed to prevent forfeiture of rights. 2' They
also led to inconsistent interpretations2 6 and a further complication
cloth, which necessarily is cut off or sewn in such a way that it is not visible when the
clothing is manufactured, was sufficient. Judge Hand stated that the defendant bore the
burden of showing that notice "could have been embodied in the design without impairing its market value." Id. at 490; accord Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp.,
188 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). This standard had no basis in the Copyright Act.
See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 80 (1967) [hereinafter
KAPLAN].

22. See Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 801 (1968) (holding that "defendants, as willful infringers wholly
aware of the existence of the copyright, are in no position to assert the insufficiency of the
notice") (quoting Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Novelty Jewelry Co., 309 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1962));
accord Tonka Corp. v. Tsaisun Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1387, 1400-01 (D. Minn. 1986)
(holding that because defendants "were not innocently misled by an omission of copyright notice . . ., they are not in a position to assert the deficiency of the notice").
23. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 146-47 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 1476].
24. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1978). Under § 405(a)(2), an omission may be cured if the
work is registered within five years of publication without notice and if a reasonable effort
is made to add notice to all copies distributed after discovery of the omission. Id. In
addition, § 405(a)(1) excuses omission of a notice "from no more than a relatively small
number of copies," and § 405(a)(3) excuses notice omitted in violation of an express written requirement. Id.
25. See Princess Fabrics, Inc. v. CHF, Inc., 922 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1990); Pacific
Creative Advertising v. Southwestern Bell Corp., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164, 1165-66
(9th Cir. 1990); Eastern Publishing & Advertising, Inc. v. Chesapeake Publishing & Advertising, Inc., 831 F.2d 488, 491 (4th Cir. 1987); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp. 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177, 1180-83 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Sunset Lamp Corp v. Alsy Corp.,
698 F. Supp. 1146, 1152-53 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
26. For example, a controversy arose regarding whether an author could cure a deliberate omission of notice. Compare Beacon Looms, Inc. v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., Inc., 552
F. Supp. 1305, 1310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (deliberate omission of notice cannot be cured)
and 2 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.13(B)(3) with Hasbro-Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys,
Inc. 780 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1985) (deliberate omission of notice may be cured) and O'Neill
Devs., Inc. v. Galen Kilburn, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Ga. 1981). There is also a
split of opinion and some confusion concerning when a reasonable effort to add notice to
copies of a work under § 405(b)(2) must include efforts to place -notice on copies of a
work possessed by distributors or retailers. Donald Frederick Evans v. Continental
Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 911 & n.22 (11 th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Eastern Publishing &
Advertising, 831 F.2d at 491 (holding that placement of notice of copyrighted advertising
in later issues of newspaper was ineffective to cure an initial omission); Shapiro & Son
Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Assocs., 764 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a
bedspread manufacturer's act of affixing notice to bedspreads still in its possession but not
to bedspreads shipped to retailers was not necessarily deficient as a "reasonable effort");
Disenos Artisticos E. Industriales, S.A. v. Work, 676 F. Supp. 1254, 1261-63 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding that adequate steps to remedy lack of notice had not been taken because
none of the products in inventory or possessed by distributors were properly labeled).
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B.

Remedial Provisions

1. Preclusion of Damages
Section 405(b) of the 1976 Act 28 provided that in cases in which
no loss of rights resulted from the lack of notice on a work,29 one
who innocently copied a work in reliance on the absence of notice
would not be liable for either actual or statutory damages. 30 The
innocence defense provided under section 405(b), however, did not
preclude an award of profits, which a court could award in its
discretion. 3 '
The "innocent-infringement" defense was also subject to two important requirements, which effectively limited the defense to exceptional situations. First, the infringer had to show that he or she
had actually relied on and been misled by the omission of a notice.32 Second, the infringer had to show that the copy of the work
lacking a notice on which he or she had relied was "authorized" by
27. See NEC Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 (relying on "twenty federal court
decisions" concerning issue of what is a "relatively small number" of copies from which
notice is excused under § 405(b)(1)).
28. Section 405(b) stated:
Any person who innocently infringes a copyright, in reliance upon an authorized copy or phonorecord from which the copyright notice has been omitted,
incurs no liability for actual or statutory damages under section 504 for any
infringing acts committed before receiving actual notice that registration for the
work has been made under section 408, if such person proves that he or she was
misled by the omission of notice.
17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1978).
29. An omission of notice continued to be relevant apart from the question of
whether the copyright was forfeited if it was cured, see infra notes 30, 32, or if notice were
omitted from a derivative work without affecting the validity of the underlying work. See
Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992); Applied
Innovations v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 876 F.2d 626, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1989);
Russell v. Price, 448 F. Supp. 303, 304-05 (C.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128
(9th Cir. 1979).
30. See Estate of Vane v. The Fair, Inc., 849 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989); Raco Car Wash Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 730 F. Supp. 695, 705
(D.S.C. 1989); Ruskin v. Sunrise Mgmt., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Colo. 1981).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1978). The court could also either enjoin the innocent infringer or require the infringer to pay a reasonable license fee to continue the infringing
activity. Id.
32. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 446-47 (4th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the defendants were not misled by the lack of copyright notice, although
they may have believed that the plaintiff did not own a valid copyright); Williams v.
Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 581 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding that despite the absence of copyright notice from the plaintiff's work, the defendant did not reasonably rely on the lack of
notice).
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the copyright holder. 33 Particularly because of this second requirement, courts rejected the innocent-infringement defense even in
those cases in which the defendant had little reason to believe a
work was copyrighted.34
2.

Effect of Notice on Statutory Damages

To the extent that-it could affect a defendant's state of mind, the
absence of a notice could also be relevant in measuring statutory
damages. Under section 504 of the 1976 Act, statutory damages
may be awarded in lieu of actual damages and profits, at the copyright owner's request, 35 if the plaintiff registered the copyright
before the infringement took place or within three months of the
first publication of the work.36
Two subsections control the limits on the measure of statutory
damages. Section 504(c)(1) governs the usual case, whereby the
court has discretion to award between the statutory minimum and
maximum, "as the court considers just. ' 37 Although the statute
contains no criteria for determining statutory damage awards,
courts have been normally guided by the perceived purpose of statutory damage awards as both compensation for the copyright
owner and deterrence of future infringement. 31 Courts have focused on the plaintiff's estimated actual damages and the defendant's profits and then modified the award on the basis of the
perceived degree of the defendant's innocence and the need for deterrence.3 9 Some courts have indicated that the most relevant fac33. See Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
34. Id.; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, § 3.5.3.
35. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a), (c) (1978).
36. Id. § 412(a).
37. Id. § 504(c)(1). Prior to the BCIA, § 504(c)(1) prescribed statutory damages between $250 and $10,000. After the BCIA became effective in March 1989, the dollar
amounts of statutory damages doubled. Now an ordinary infringer can be liable under
§ 504(c)(1) for an award between $500 and $20,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1992). The
increases were intended to strengthen incentives to register works. 133 CONG. REC.
14,544 (daily ed. October 5, 1988), reprintedin 35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 16, 39 (1988).
38. Warner Bros, Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740, 769 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1989); United Feature
Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1481 (S.D. Fla. 1983). This
differs from the 1909 Act analysis, which allowed statutory damages only if actual damages were difficult to measure. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.04[A] n.3.
39. Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 144, 147
(D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 821 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Fitzgerald Publishing Co., Inc. v.
Baylor Publishing Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1117 (2d Cir. 1986); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Allis, 667 F. Supp. 356, 358 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Rare Blue Music, Inc. v. Guttadauro, 616
F. Supp. 1528, 1530 (D. Mass. 1985); Unimusica, Inc. v. Spanish Community Radio,
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tor in awarding statutory damages is the "blameworthiness" of a
defendant's conduct.?°
Section 504(c)(2) governs "exceptional" cases, in which a defendant either "willfully" infringed or, conversely, "was not aware
and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright."4 If a defendant acted willfully, the
$10,000 limit could be increased, prior to the BCIA, to up to
$50,000.42 If the infringer had no reason to believe that he or she
was infringing a copyright,
statutory damages could be decreased
43
from $250 to $100.
Although section 504(c) has never contained a reference to the
use of a copyright notice, courts occasionally considered the presence of a notice in assessing under section 504(c)(2), whether an
infringer "had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted
an infringement."' Unlike complete remission of damages under
section 405(b), this type of claim of innocence did not depend on
whether the relevant copy lacking notice was authorized by the
copyright owner 4 5 because the claim depended on what the defendant reasonably believed rather than what the plaintiff authorized.
This innocent-infringement defense was nonetheless rarely
accepted.'
Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,091 (D.N.M. 1987); Doehrer v. Caldwell, 207
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 391, 393 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
40. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 465
(E.D. Pa. 1987); Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (D.R.I. 1982).
In International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 658 (N.D. Ill. 1987),
aff'd, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988), the court stated that "the willfulness of the defendant's conduct, and the deterrent value of the sanction imposed" should be the primary
factors in awarding statutory damages; accord Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines and Co.,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), vacated
on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1408 (1991).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1978). Section 504(c)(2) places the burden of proof upon
the copyright owner to show why ordinary statutory damages should be increased above
the statutory maximum provided by § 504(c)(1). Id. An infringer must sustain the burden of proving that his or her infringement was innocent in order to show why the ordinary statutory damages should be decreased below the minimum specified in § 504(c)(1).
Id.
42. Id. Now, a willful infringer may be liable for up to $100,000. 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c)(2) (1992); see also supra note 37.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1978). Now an innocent infringer may be liable for as little
as $200. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1992); see also supra note 37.
44. D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1990); Original
Appalachian Artworks, 658 F. Supp. at 464-65; see also Plymouth Music Co. v. Magnus
Organ Corp., 456 F. Supp. 676, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
45. See D.C. Comics Inc., 912 F.2d at 35-36.
46. See Jeffrey M. Thomas, Comment, Willful Copyright Infringement: In Search of a
Standard, 65 WASH. L. REV. 903, 919 n. 107 (1990) [hereinafter Willful Infringement]
(identifying Broadcast Music Inc. v. Coco's Dev. Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 714
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C.

Function of Copyright Notice

Theoretically, formal copyright notice serves important functions by providing information to the public concerning a work. It
allows subsequent users to determine: (1) the status of the work as
copyrighted; (2) the identity of the owner of the copyright; and
(3) the date of the first publication of the work triggering the statutory term of the copyright. 4 This function of notice, however,
has long been exposed as unreliable because of the limited extent
and value of the information actually provided. 8
Because the 1976 Act excuses some omissions and provides a
five-year cure period, one cannot rely on a lack of notice to determine the status of a work.4 9 In addition, because copyrights owned
by individuals expire fifty years after the death of the author 5°
rather than after a fixed period, one cannot rely on the notice date
in determining whether a copyright has expired.
Notice also fails to reveal important information for several
types of works. When used on a derivative work, the copyright
notice need not disclose any information regarding the underlying
work." Similarly, a notice on a collective work gives no information concerning the individual works contained therein.5 2 A notice
(N.D.N.Y. 1981), as the only case in which a defendant was found innocent within the
provision and criticizing the result). But see D.C. Comics Inc., 912 F.2d at 35-36; Warner
Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1989).
47. The House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act also identified "the effect of placing in the public domain a substantial body of published material that no one is interested
in copyrighting" as a beneficial function of notice. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at
143. This justification is obsolete, in light of the elimination of the copyright notice requirement, regardless of the merits of its rationale that injecting copyrighted matter into
the public domain is a good thing.
48. During hearings on United States adherance to Berne, Irwin Karp, Chairman of
the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, scathingly
attacked the purported benefits of notice to subsequent users, stating, -[n]o commercial
user with any copyright-common sense would rely on a copyright notice to determine
ownership of rights it contemplated buying, licensing or otherwise acquiring." Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Comm. on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 162 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings].
Professor John Kernochan concurred, stating that notice is "virtually worthless to users
in many situations" and that "[n]o conscientious lawyer can advise a client today that,
because a work bears no copyright notice, it may, without more, be assumed to be unprotected by copyright." Id. at 182; see also KAPLAN, supra note 21, at 81-82 (the benefits of
notice "are subject to discount in many situations").
49. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1978); see also Hearings, supra note 48, at 128 (prepared
statement of Donald J. Quigg).
51. 2 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.02[A].
52. 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) (1978).
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will not reflect a subsequent transfer of ownership rights; and, in
works
many industries, rights must be acquired in unpublished
53
notice.
of
type
any
contain
to
that are not required
Thus, even proponents of notice have recognized that a person
who wishes to determine ownership in a work "must necessarily go
beyond the notice."51 4 To determine the copyright status or ownership of a work, it is far more useful to investigate registration
records,"5 and investigation is universally recommended,56 at least
for those works that have been registered.
III. THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT NOTICE PROVISIONS
A. Elimination of Notice as a Requirement for Protection
Despite its suspect utility as an informational device," the statutory copyright notice was not seriously challenged until Congress
was forced to amend the notice requirements in order to join the
Berne Convention.5" In order to join the Berne Convention, the
Copyright Act notice provisions had to be amended to conform to
Berne's prohibition of formalities as a condition to the "enjoyment6
and the exercise" of rights.59 Four approaches were available: 0
(1) deletion of the provisions relating to notice; (2) creation of
provisions for voluntary use, with the statute specifying the form of
notice; (3) elimination of notice as a requirement for protection
but encouragement of its use through incentives; and (4) creation
of an exception to the notice requirements only for works originating in a Berne Union country other than the United States. 6 '
53. See Hearings,supra note 48, at 162 (prepared statement of Irwin Karp).
54. Id. at 74 (statement of Donald C. Curran). Mr. Curran stated, however, that
notice is valuable for providing "at least a starting point for determining ownership and
duration." Id. at 75.
55. See Technicon Medical Info. v. Green Bay Packaging, 687 F.2d 1032, 1036 & n.8
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983) (holding that the use of a notice does
not provide actual benefit to a party for purposes of statutory estoppel because "a proper
analysis of a work's status under the 1909 Copyright Act must involve more than a reading of the notice of the work").
56. The Copyright Office itself recommends a search of registration records, rather
than reliance solely on a copyright notice to determine ownership. Id. (citing United
States Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Circular No. 22 (1973)).
57. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
58. Berne Convention, supra note 1. Several attempts had been made to eliminate
notice as a condition for protection during the period between the two world wars in
order to join Berne. Hearings, supra note 48, at 73 (statement of Donald C. Curran).
59. Berne Convention, supra note 1, at art. 5(2).
60. These approaches are listed from the most to the least permissive.
61. Staff of the U.S. Copyright Office, Implementing Legislation to Permit US. Adherence to the Berne Convention: A Draft Discussion Bill & Commentary, in FINAL REPORT OF THE AD Hoc WORKING GROUP ON U.S.

ADHERENCE TO THE BERNE
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In keeping with the "minimalist" approach toward amending
the Act, the Copyright Office favored the last approach creating a
dual system for domestic and foreign authors. 62 Congress, however, rejected the dual system for copyright notice while adopting
it for other formalities.6 a Therefore, notice need not be included on
copies of any work distributed after March 1, 1989.64
Congress did not eliminate the notice provisions because of the
perception that the formal copyright notice served an important
informational function. Because Congress retained the myriad
provisions governing proper use of notice to provide an evidentiary
incentive, the substantial body of law that arose governing the use
of copyright notice still exists, theoretically, even for post-Berne
works.65 Whether that precedent will have any future relevance in
fact 66 depends on what importance is given to the use of a notice in
the remedying of infringements.
B.

Preclusion of Innocence Defense in Awarding Actual
Damages

Under the BCIA, the use of a copyright notice in the specified
form 67 will constitute evidence precluding "a defendant's interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of
CONVENTION app. A, reprintedin 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 633 (1986) [hereinafter Commentary]; InternationalizingCopyright, supra note 3, at 500 & n. 176.
62. The Copyright Office's commentary stated that the long tradition of requiring
notice and the informational value of notice to librarians, educators, and students would
justify discrimination against U.S. authors. Commentary, supra note 61, at 121.
63. While foreign authors need not register their copyrights and deposit their works
before bringing a suit under the Copyright Act, domestic authors must still follow this
practice. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1992). Congress eliminated for both domestic and foreign
works the formality requiring that a transfer be recorded before a subsequent owner
could bring a copyright action in the owner's name.
64. Id. § 401(a). Works that were first published prior to that date without notice are
still subject to forfeiture unless the omission is cured. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
65. 2 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 7.02[C][3] n.22; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, § 3.5.1.
The COMPENDIUM, supra note 14, governing review of works deposited when registering
copyrights, has also not been changed since passage of the BCIA.
66. Because notice is no longer required, there should be an increase in the number of
infringement actions brought under the Copyright Act. Authors who, through an initial
lack of interest in copyright protection, do not place a notice on their works will no
longer be deterred from alleging copyright infringement later. An increase in copyright
infringement claims should result, particularly in conjunction with suits for other violations. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
67. The form of notice now sufficient to satisfy this provision is the same as that
required prior to the BCIA. See H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 1, at 26 ("At the same
time, if a copyright owner elects to use a notice, its form is specified in the law.").
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actual or statutory damages."'6 Thus, in considering the continued
importance of the statutorily prescribed notice, the effect the innocent-infringement defense may have in mitigating (1) actual damages and (2) statutory damages must be assessed.
Congress amended section 405(b)--the only provision furnishing
an innocent-infringement defense to avoid actual damages-to exclude copies of works publicly distributed after the effective date of
the BCIA.6 9 Therefore, reliance on the omission of notice from
copies of a work distributed after March 1989 should no longer
constitute a defense to avoid actual as well as statutory damages
under section 405(b).
The exclusion of Berne-era works from the only provision on
mitigating actual damages seems contradictory to the BCIA's incentive to use a copyright notice in section 401(d). The legislative
history of section 401(d) sheds no light on this apparent contradiction. The House Report broadly states that courts have taken into
account "the relative innocence or guilt of the defendant in assessing both actual and statutory damages."' 70 The Report, however,
cites three cases that do little to support the contention that innocence has been relevant in assessing actual damages.71
In one of the cases, the court applied section 405(b).72 Because
that provision was eliminated for post-Berne works, cases in which
it was applied have no relevance to the incentive Congress attempted to create. The only other citations in the House Report
7
are to a 1939 decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
and a 1960 decision by the District Court for the Southern District
of New York,7 4 both of which contained dicta arguably supporting
the contention that the defendant's state of mind has been relevant
68. 17 U.S.C. § 401(d) (1992). This section does not preclude the defense of innocent
infringement available to nonprofit educational institutions, libraries, and archives and
public broadcasting stations that reasonably believe their uses were fair enabling them to
remit statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). In addition, in order for works
incorporating predominant portions of U.S. government works to receive the evidentiary
benefit of § 401(d), a statement must be appended to the notice identifying what is copyrighted by the author. Id. § 403.
69. Section 405(b) states that it applies to authorized copies of a work "publicly, distributed by authority of the copyright owner before the effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988." Id. § 405(b).
70. H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 1, at 45.
71. Id. at 45 n. 107 (citing Ruskin v. Sunrise Mgmt., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Colo.
1981); Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 308 U.S. 604 (1939); Peter
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 188 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
72. Ruskin, 506 F. Supp. at 1289.
73. Barry, 103 F.2d at 427.
74. Peter Pan Fabrics, 188 F. Supp. at 235.
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in assessing actual damages. The dicta in the appellate decision,
Barry v. Hughes,75 was explicitly rejected five years later by the
Second Circuit in DeAcosta v. Brown,76 in which the court affirmed
a recovery of actual damages "as against even an innocent
77
copier."

Thus, whether or not statutory copyright notice appears on a
work should have no effect on a plaintiff's ability to recover actual
damages. 7' There is simply no authority granting a court discretion to decrease actual damages on the basis of a defendant's state
of mind.79
C.

Preclusion of Innocence Defense to Lower Statutory Damages

The significance of foreclosing an innocent-infringement defense
should therefore be limited to assessing statutory damages under
section 504(c). In this regard, the BCIA has doubled the amount
of statutory damages, so that now an ordinary infringer may be
liable for between $500 and $20,000, a willful infringer for up to
$100,000, and an innocent infringer for as little as $200.0
Innocent infringement is not defined in section 401(d), nor is the
term used in section 504. As it relates to mitigating statutory damages, the phrase innocent infringement has generally been used by
courts8" and understood by commentators8 2 to refer to the reduction in the minimum level of statutory damages under section
75. The court stated: "We should hesitate a long while before holding that the use of
material, apparently in the public demesne, subjected the user to damages, unless something put him actually on notice." Barry, 103 F.2d at 427.
76. 146 F.2d 408, 411-12 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862-63 (1945).
77. Id. Other cases in the Second Circuit have subsequently held that innocence is no
defense to an award of actual damages. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316
F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963); Plymouth Music Co. v. Magnus Organ Corp., 456 F. Supp.
676, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 459-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); accord Little Mole Music v. Spike Inv., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 751, 754-55
(W.D. Mo. 1989); Knickerbocker Toy Co., Inc. v. Genie Toys, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 526,
529 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
78. The failure of Congress to consider the validity of this incentive is consistent with
the view that the drafting of the Copyright Act has been influenced more by compromise
than by.concerns over legal principles. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise,
and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 865 (1987) ("[E]ven the sponsors of
copyright revision [for the 1976 Act] demonstrated little knowledge and few opinions
about the substance of the bills they introduced.").
79. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1992) states that "the copyright owner is entitled to recover
the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement." Id. See also 3
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 14.02 n.3.1 ("[I]njury to plaintiff in the marketplace does not
hinge on defendant's innocence or willfulness.").
80. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1992); see also supra notes 37, 42-43.
81. D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1990); Fitzgerald
Publishing Co., Inc. v. Baylor Publishing Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986);
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504(c)(2), when an infringer shows he or she "was not aware and
had no reason to believe8 3that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.)
If limited to section 504(c)(2) in this manner, the effect of section
401(d) would be exceedingly narrow.8 4 Infringers who claim that
an award should be decreased to $200 would not automatically be
considered innocent because a work lacked a copyright notice.8 5
To the contrary, because section 504(c)(2) requires defendants to
show that they had "no reason to believe" they had infringed, 6 the
fact that the law no longer requires copyright notice should dispose
of claims of innocence based solely on an omission of notice.8 7 In
other words, if a notice has no effect on the copyright status of a
work, the lack of a notice provides no reason to believe that copying is lawful.
Moreover, in order to obtain statutory damages in the first place,
a claim of copyright must be registered at the time of the infringement or within three months of a work's publication.88 A registration provides constructive notice of a claim and gives a defendant
the opportunity to gather more meaningful information about a
work than that provided by a notice. 9 Thus, if a work is registered, omission of notice provides little justification for a claim of
innocent intent. 90
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 464-65
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
82. Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 2, at 11; Spector, supra note 2, at 111 n.24,
113 n.27; Willful Infringement, supra note 46, at 906; see also 3 NIMMER, supra note 1,
§ 14.04[B].
83. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (c)(2) (1992); see also supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text.
84. Claims of innocence to lower statutory damages under § 504(c)(2), as discussed,
have rarely been successful. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
85. 2 NIMMER, supra note 1, 7.02[C] n.23 ("[T]he benefit of notice during the Berne
era is to establish a bright line rule for preclusion of this defense; notice is not, however, a
sine qua non for preclusion of the defense.").
86. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1992).
87. See Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 2, at 11 (arguing that "the 'not aware and
had no reason to believe' standard ought not to excuse most defendants engaged in commercial exploitation of copyrighted works" and that application of the standard may
"remove any powerful incentive to add notice" after passage of the BCIA, but nonetheless stating that use of the statutory notice is advisable). Congress apparently did not
consider this point. See S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 43 (1988) [hereinafter S.
REP. No. 352] ("Obviously, in a case in which the copies of the work to which the defendant had access do not contain a notice of copyright, the defendant may be able to
meet this burden" under § 504(c)(2)).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1992). Copyright notice need no longer be included on copies of
works deposited in the Copyright Office. Id. § 407(a).
89. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
90. Cf. WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 175 (6th ed. 1986) (in
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The presence of a statutory notice should have the potential to
affect the outcome of a case only when the claim of innocence is
based on factors other than a lack of notice. 9' Courts construing
claims of innocence have often been concerned not with a defendant's belief regarding whether a work was copyrighted but with
whether a defendant believed in good faith that he or she was not
infringing the copyright. 92 For example, defendants who merely
bought and resold infringing items could claim innocence if they
did not realize that the goods they sold were unauthorized. 93 The
presence of a copyright notice should have no relevance in such
situations. 94 Likewise, in cases in which a defendant believed that
the use of a work did not infringe the copyright because no protected expression was taken95 or because the use amounted to a fair
use,96 the presence of a copyright notice is irrelevant to the claim of
innocence. Nevertheless, if a copyright notice has been used, secterms of former § 405(b), if a work is registered, "it might ... be argued that one who
does not search [Copyright Office records] cannot be 'innocent' or 'misled'" by lack of
notice).
91. Congress apparently did not consider the possibility of precluding a claim of innocence based on facts other than an omission of notice. See S. REP. No. 352, supra note
87, at 43.
92. See N.A.S. Import Corp. v. Chenson Enters., Inc., 968 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating that "an infringement may not be willful when a party, despite warnings to
the contrary, 'reasonably and in good faith believes' that its conduct is innocent") (quoting RCA/Ariola Int'l v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1988));
Fitzgerald Publishing Co., Inc. v. Baylor Publishing Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that an infringer acts willfully if it has "knowledge that its actions
constitute an infringement").
93. See D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1990); Warner
Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1989); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 464-65 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
94. In D.C. Comics Inc., 912 F.2d at 36, however, the court affirmed a finding of
innocent infringement under § 504(c)(2) in favor of a retailer who merely sold infringing
goods manufactured by a third party because of "the lack of business sophistication and
the absence of a copyright notice on the infringing goods." The court did not mention
that the presence of a notice would have precluded the § 504(c)(2) claim and mentioned
the omission of notice as a factor which "explained the failure of defendants to inquire as
to the source of the goods." Id. The court failed to explain why a notice on an unauthorized copy would have caused the retailer to investigate. The court's other finding on the
question of innocence-that lay persons would have difficulty discriminating between licensed and unlicensed products-supports the finding of innocence. Id.
95. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines and Co., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 815, 820 (N.D. Ill.
1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1408
(1991).
96. See MGM v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 857, 859
(N.D. Ga. 1981). Only nonprofit educational institutions, libraries, and archives and
public broadcasting stations are able to remit statutory damages entirely because of a
belief in the "fair use" of a work, under § 504(c)(2). See supra note 68.
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tion 401(d) could preclude defendants with such claims from arguing that they were unaware or had no reason to believe that they
were infringing a copyright.
It may be argued, however, that despite the common usage of
the phrase innocent infringement by courts and commentators,97
the reference in section 401(d) to "a defense based on innocent infringement" applies to the determination of an award of statutory
damages under section 504(c)(1) as well as section 504(c)(2).
Plaintiffs have been unable to show willfulness under section
504(c)(2), while av the same time defendants have been unable to
meet the "had no reason to know" standard under that section.9"
Because courts in such cases have still analyzed the degree of innocence and need for deterrence of the defendant, 99 a defendant's
"relative innocence" has been relevant in all cases involving statutory damages, not just in exceptional cases.
The potential effect of section 401(d) would be substantially
greater if it were interpreted to apply beyond the innocence defense
of section 504(c)(2). Under this interpretation, claims of good faith
to avoid enhanced statutory damages based on deterrence under
section 504(c)(1) 100 would be precluded if a notice had been used
on published copies. Furthermore, a defendant faced with a
charge of willfulness under section 504(c)(2) could conceivably
have no defense to a claim for maximum statutory damages. 10 '
Thus, a defendant could be barred from showing good faith in response to the plaintiff's evidence of willfulness or relative
willfulness.
The legislative history regarding the scope of section 401(d) is
conflicting. 10 2 In its discussion of the effect of section 401(d), the
97. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
98. Fitzgerald Publishing Co., Inc. v. Baylor Publishing Co., Inc., 807 F.2d I 110,
1115 (2d Cir. 1986); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F.
Supp. 458, 464-65 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
99. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; see also Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 744
F. Supp. at 820-21 (rejecting the plaintiff's claim of willful infringement but awarding
twice the license fee the defendant would have had to pay the plaintiff "to discourage
future violations"); MGM, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 859 (awarding $500 rather than $250
for "unintentional infringement").
100. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
101.

See 1 HAROLD ORENSTEIN & DAVID E. GUINN, ENTERTAINMENT LAW AND

BUSINESS § 1.7.1 n.133 (1992). The standard of "willfulness" has been expanded by
some courts beyond a defendant's knowledge that its actions constituted an infringement
to "reckless disregard" of a copyright owner's rights. N.A.S. Import Corp. v. Chenson
Enters., Inc., 968 F.2d 250, 253 (2d Cir. 1992); Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 744 F. Supp. at 820.
102. The House bill, H.R. 4262, was passed in lieu of the Senate bill, S. 1301, but
after its language was amended to contain the text of the Senate bill. There was no
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Senate Report refers only to the "was not aware and had no reason
to believe" standard of section 504(c)(2). 10 3 In the House Report,
however, the discussion of section 401(d) is clearly in terms of the
usual case involving section 504(c)(1); the "had no reason to believe" standard is mentioned only as one defense that could be precluded through the use of the statutory notice.' ° 4 Immediately
after noting that courts have used "the relative innocence of the
defendant as a major factor in setting the amount of the award"
under section 504(c)(1), the House Report states that "[t]he intent
of new sections 401(d) and 402(d) is to direct the courts not to
consider the defendant's claim of innocence" if notice is used.' 0 5
It is submitted that the definition of "a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages"'"
should embrace only claims that a defendant was not aware and
had no reason to believe he or she was infringing a copyright under
section 504(c)(2). The only specific defense to mitigate statutory
damages is that found in section 504(c)(2), and only that provision
expressly refers to mitigating damages. The statute does not direct
a court to conclude that an infringement is willful in terms of section 504(c)(2) or relatively willful in terms of section 504(c)(1) if a
notice is used. Defendants thus should not be effectively prevented
from claiming either that they were not willful or that deterrence is
unnecessary simply because a notice appeared on a work.
By allowing evidence of intent in the usual case, courts would
retain one of the only defined criteria for exercising their discretion
in awarding statutory damages. 01 7 Without any evidence of intent,
statutory damage awards would become more arbitrary, without
any relationship to what "is just" 08 under the circumstances of the
conference report. The provisions concerning notice were substantially similar in both
bills prior to the amendment and passage of the House bill. See infra note 103.
103. S. REP. No. 352, supra note 87, at 43-44. The Senate had deleted from S. 1301
quotation marks around the term "innocent infringement" and added from the House bill
a specific reference to the last sentence in § 504(c)(2). The Joint Explanatory Statement
on the amendment states that it was "to clarify that the presence of voluntary notice
affects only the ability of a defendant to seek to mitigate damages under the second sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (dealing with an infringer who was not aware and had no
reason to believe that he was infringing) and not the ability of a library, archives, or
public broadcasting defendant to seek remission of damages (as provided by the last sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)) under a reasonable belief that the fair use provision of 17
U.S.C. [§]107 applied." 134 CONG. REC. S14,556 (daily ed. October 5, 1988).
104. H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 1, at 45.
105. Id.
106. 17 U.S.C. § 401(d) (1992).
107. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1992).
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case.
Limiting the incentive to use a notice only to defeat a section
504(c)(2) claim of innocence is further justified by reference to the
Berne Convention's prohibition of formalities as a condition to the
enjoyment and exercise of rights. 109 If the incentive to use a notice
had been more significant, there arguably would have been a risk of
conflict with this provision." 0
Limitation of the evidentiary benefit under section 401(d) should
also mitigate the potential inconsistency in applying the Copyright
Act to foreign authors who do not conform to the U.S. copyright
notice requirements."' This inconsistency is aggravated by the
coverage of section 401 over works published in the United States
"or elsewhere." A foreign author who wishes to ensure he or she
benefits from the statutory incentive must place a notice not only
on works exported to the United States, but also on works published within the foreign nation to which a U.S. citizen may have
2
access. "1
Thus, although the lack of a definition of the phrase innocent
infringement as used in section 401(d) and the analysis of that section in the House Report create ambiguities, the Senate Report and
the ordinary meaning given the phrase by courts and authorities
should support the limitation of section 401(d) to section 504(c)(2)
claims to lower minimum statutory damages. This construction
also does the least damage to the operation of the statutory damages provisions by avoiding results not addressed by Congress in
enacting the BCIA.
109. The Copyright Act expressly provides that the Berne Convention is not selfexecuting. Id. § 104(c). A conflict with Berne therefore would not be determinative in
interpreting § 401(d).
110. See Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 2, at 11-12 (arguing that "while Congress sought to encourage notice, that encouragement was not to assume the form of a
disguised requirement," and noting the Senate Report's statement that the BCIA was
"creating a limited incentive for notice which is compatible with Berne") (emphasis
added).
11. See InternationalizingCopyright, supra note 3, at 501; Ginsburg & Kernochan,
supra note 2, at 18.
112. Ginsburg and Kernochan give the example of a French author whose works are
sold without notice in France, bought there by a U.S. citizen, and then copied and distributed in the United States. They conclude that the U.S. citizen "would assert the innocent
infringer defense, and perhaps obtain a diminution of damages." Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 2, at 18.
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LEGAL PRINCIPLES BEYOND THE COPYRIGHT ACT

A. Effect of Notice under Case Law Doctrines
Outside the strict provisions of the Copyright Act, case law established one cognizable principle giving effect to the use of a notice, which, like statutory damage principles, was based largely on
an assessment of a defendant's state of mind. Specifically, a few
courts have held that the affirmative defense of estoppel does not
apply if a copyright notice appeared on the copied work."1 3 The
rationale behind this rule is that the presence of a copyright notice
gives the infringer continuing notice of a claim of rights, thus destroying the requisite elements of a "holding out" by the plaintiff
and reliance and ignorance of the true facts by the defendant.
In light of the abolishment of the notice requirement, it is uncertain whether courts will continue to apply this doctrine. Since notice is irrelevant to the copyright status of a work, the lack of a
notice should not contribute to a defendant's reliance on an author's inaction." 4 In cases in which the copyright in a work is
registered, absence of a copyright notice should have even less significance, as registration should provide the same continuing notice
of rights.' 15

B. Effect of Notice under the Universal Copyright Convention
The accession of the United States to the Berne Convention does
not affect its membership in the Universal Copyright Convention
("UCC"),II 6 which it helped create and ratified in 1954 as an alternative to Berne. Under Article III of the UCC, a work may be
protected in a foreign member nation in accordance with the laws
of the nation where protection is sought. Adherence to formalities
that are conditions for copyright protection in member nations is
excused only if the work contains a copyright notice with the following elements: the symbol ©,the name of the copyright owner,
113. Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp.
1156, 1184 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). In general, the estoppel defense may bar an action if the
following conditions are met: (1) the plaintiff must know the facts; (2) the plaintiff must
intend that his conduct shall be acted on or so act that the defendant has a right to believe
it is so intended; (3) the defendant must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the defendant must rely on the plaintiff's conduct to his detriment. Hampton, 279 F.2d at 104.
114. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
116. The Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 8, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, revised July
24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341 [hereinafter UCC]. The text of the UCC, as revised in Paris in
1971, is reprinted in 5 NIMMER, supra note 1, at app. 25.
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and the year of first publication.' 17 The use of the notice is not per
se a condition for protection under the UCC but it excuses other
formalities,118 such as deposit, registration, and notarial
certificates. II9
While the UCC notice provision favors continued use of the first
of the three forms of copyright notice prescribed in the U.S. Act, 120
it applies only to protection in countries adhering to the UCC but
not to Berne; in countries adhering to both treaties, the Berne Convention takes precedence over the UCC. Twenty-five nations, including South Korea and several Central American and African
nations, belong to the UCC but not to Berne. 2 '
The use of a copyright notice would be necessary to ensure protection in those countries that actually require formalities. Most
countries not adhering to Berne do not require formalities.1 22 In
addition, the UCC does not require a country to deny
protection if
23
used.1
not
is
notice
and
followed
not
is
a formality
The Berne Convention itself also provides a procedural benefit
that may be available through the use of a copyright notice. Under
Article 15(2) of the Convention, a copyright owner whose name is
displayed on a work "in the usual manner" presumptively has
standing to institute an infringement proceeding in a member
country.1 24 The name in a copyright notice could perhaps satisfy
this provision.' 25 This benefit, however, could be obtained without
resort to the technical requirements contained in the U.S. Copy117. UCC, supra note 116, at art. III(1).
118. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 17.08.
119. The use of the notice will also excuse the requirement, imposed in some nations,
that a work first be published within the country's borders. Id.; 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note
8, § 16.6.2.
120. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
121. These countries are: Algeria, Andorra, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Cambodia,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya,
Laos, Malawi, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Panama, Russia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, South Korea, and Zambia. See 5 NIMMER, supra note 1, at app. 2122. Russia is deemed to be a successor state of the Soviet Union and therefore a participant in the UCC. However, as a result of a bilateral agreement with the United States,
Russia is obligated to enact new copyright laws and join the Berne Convention. Allen J.
Baden & Charles R. Brainard, Slow Progressfor Intellectual Property Protection, AM.
LAW., Nov. 1992, at 41, 46.
122. 3 NIMMER, supra note 1, § 17.08.
123. Id.
124. Berne Convention, supra note 1, at art. 15(2).
125. See PAUL E. GELLER, International Copyright: An Introduction, in 1 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & PAUL E. GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 5, Int-141 (1991) [hereinafter GELLER, InternationalCopyright]; 2 NIMMER, supra note
1, § 7.02[B] n.5.

Questionable Utility of Copyright Notice

1993]

right Act governing the form of notice.126
V.

A.

THE FUTURE USE OF COPYRIGHT NOTICE

Effect of Legal Incentives on Continued Use of Notice

The attempt by Congress to preserve the vitality of the statutorily prescribed copyright notice should provide little incentive to
authors to continue its use. The opportunity to preclude "a defense based on innocent infringement" should, initially, be available only if a work has been timely registered so that statutory
damages are available. 27 If an author does not register the copyright in his or her work unless and until a suit is filed, only actual
damages and profits will be available, 2 ' which should be unaffected by claims of innocence. 29 For those authors, the statutory
incentive itself should be irrelevant to whether a notice is used.
For those who register their works in a timely fashion, there is
an identifiable incentive to use a notice. This incentive, however,
should consist only of the opportunity to prevent a lowering of the
minimum level of statutory damages through a successful claim
that an infringer "was not aware and had no reason to believe" his
or her conduct constituted copyright infringement. 30 This incentive is limited because the innocence defense should normally be
rejected whether or not a notice is used, due to the abolishment of
the copyright notice requirement as a basis on which to believe that
a work is not copyrighted and the fact that the defense can necessarily be raised only when an investigation of registration records is
available.
A notice should have the potential of precluding a valid defense
only in those few cases in which a defendant acted innocently for
reasons other than a belief that a work was not copyrighted. In
cases where such a defense is not foreclosed because of failure to
use a notice, courts nonetheless retain the discretion to refrain
126.

Paul E. Geller, Copyright Protection in the Berne Union: Analyzing the Issues, 13
J.L. & ARTS 435, 464 n.91, 475 n.142 (1989). Professor Geller has also
noted that under Article 1o i , of the Berne Convention, another "formality" exists: the
media may disseminate "articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current economic, political or religious topics or like broadcast works of the same character" unless
the reproduction is "expressly reserved." GELLER, InternationalCopyright, supra note
125, at Int-142 (quoting Berne Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10b(1)). It is doubtful
that the traditional copyright notice alone could satisfy this provision.
127. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 412 (1992).
128. Id. § 412(a).
129. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
130. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1992).
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from lowering the minimum level of statutory damages. 131 For this
reason and because of the fact that courts have rarely accepted section 504(c)(2) claims,' 32 the potential effect that use of a notice
would have on an award is slight at best. If an innocence defense is
successfully precluded, a court should still be able to reduce statutory damages to $500.133 Thus, the incentive provided in section

401(d) not only requires an unlikely combination of factors to
come into play but also could affect 34
the statutory damages awarded
only in a relatively minor fashion.1
The other benefit under domestic law from using the statutory
notice is precluding an estoppel defense. The absence of a notice
alone should not be given a significant effect when assessing such a
defense, since a copyright holder need not provide notice to maintain rights to a work. Courts should be hesitant to encourage users
of works to remain ignorant of the law or to refrain from investigating possible claims. Rather than relying on notice to avoid an
estoppel defense, an author should ensure against such claims by
avoiding conduct on which an infringer could rely. As an incentive to use notice, therefore, the benefit of precluding an estoppel
defense is speculative and depends on a presumption of self-defeating behavior.
The last identified incentive, based on the provisions of the
UCC, has more potential to encourage the continued use of the
statutorily prescribed notice than domestic notice provisions. This
131. Id.; see also Major League Baseball Promotion Corp. v. Colour-Tex, Inc., 729 F.
Supp. 1035, 1046 (D.N.J. 1990).
132. See supra note 46; see also Little Mole Music v. Spike Inv., Inc., 720 F. Supp.
751, 755 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (noting that "mere non-deliberate infringement is not 'innocent'; rather, defendants must have acted in complete ignorance of the fact that [their]
conduct might somehow infringe upon the rights of another") (citation omitted).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 102-12; 3 NIMMER, supra note 1,
§ 14.04[B][2][a].
134. Significantly, the BCIA did not link the use of a copyright notice to the availability of an attorney's fee award, which is available on the same basis as are statutory
damages--i.e., if the work is registered at the time of infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 505
(1992). Some courts award fees as a matter of course to prevailing plaintiffs for infringement of registered works. Micromanipulator Co., Inc. v. Bough, 779 F.2d 255, 259 (5th
Cir. 1985); Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
Other courts do not view attorney's fees as a routine award but consider various factors,
such as whether a defendant has litigated a case in good faith or is an innocent infringer,
in determining whether to award fees. See McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d
316, 323 (9th Cir. 1987). A defendant's claim that a copied work lacked notice logically
should not have an effect on a court's determination of whether an attorney's fee award
should be granted, for the same reason it should not enable a defendant to claim statutory
damages should be mitigated. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. In both
cases, registration, providing constructive notice and relevant information on ownership,
is a prerequisite to the award.
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incentive should apply to authors who wish to ensure protection in
the few nations that both adhere to the UCC but not to the Berne
Convention and insist on adherence to formalities.
B. Effect of Nonlegal Incentives to Use Notice
However limited the legal incentives to use a notice may be, the
practice of using the statutorily prescribed copyright notice may be
continued because of nonlegal considerations. The cost of placing
a notice on several types of works is insignificant, and the placement of notice has become a customary deterrence device. 3 5 In
accordance with the traditional rationale in support of a notice requirement, 3 6 copyright notice has also been identified as providing
an economic benefit to authors in terms of lowering search costs to
promote the exploitation of a published work in secondary
markets. 137
For several types of works, however, the nonlegal benefits of using a copyright notice provide no incentive. For works inadvertently lacking a proper notice, placement or correction of the
notice on distributed copies can be extremely expensive. 138 For
other works, considerations of lowering search costs for further
commercial exploitation are nonexistent, and the burden of including the prescribed notice outweighs any deterrent benefit that notice provides.
139
For example, courts have long recognized that product labels
135. See S. REP. No. 352, supra note 87, at 128 (use of statutory notice "is, in all
probability, the cheapest deterrent to infringement which a copyright holder may take").
136. See text accompanying supra note 47.
137. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structuraland Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1612 (1982);
KAPLAN, supra note 21, at 80; cf Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d
410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (purpose of "work for hire" statutory provision requiring signed
written agreement is "to make the ownership of property rights in intellectual property
clear and definite, so that such property will be readily marketable").
138. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House of Representatives
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 232-33 (1987) (statement of Peter
Nolan) (error in notice date for a motion picture forced publisher to replace prints and
create new master negatives at a cost of several thousands of dollars).
139. A product label has long been considered copyrightable as long as it has "some
value as a composition." Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 93
(9th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964) (quoting Fargo Mercantile Co. v.
Brechet and Richter Co., 295 F. 823, 828 (8th Cir. 1924)); accord Kitchens of Sara Lee,
Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1959); FargoMercantile Co., 295 F.
at 827; Silvers v. Russell, 113 F. Supp. 119, 122 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
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and advertisements' ° are copyrightable. Because the Copyright
Act requires that a notice contain the date of first publication of a
work,' 4 ' manufacturers may be loath to include a notice for fear of
dating a product.' 42 Because label or packaging artwork may be
protected under unfair competition principles,143 obtaining an evidentiary advantage for copyrighted artwork appearing on products
should be a low priority if dating the products is a concern.
There has also been some controversy regarding whether a work
containing trade secrets should bear a copyright notice. II Because
trade secrets are by definition unpublished and because use of a
copyright notice has been required and continues to be encouraged
only for published works, the use of a notice causes some tension in
45
asserting both copyright and trade secret protection.

Proper placement of a notice is not practical for other types of
works. For example, textile manufacturers have long had difficulty
in placing a notice for their designs on fabrics sold in lengthy portions intended to be manufactured into clothing.'" Works of art
that are short-lived or occupy an unconventional amount of space
140. An early Supreme Court case upheld advertisements as proper subjects of copyright. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
141. The problem was addressed in the 1909 Act, which allowed authors to omit the
date of publication from works other than a "printed literary, musical, or dramatic
work." 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1977). In the 1976 Act, however, that provision was eliminated.
Under the 1976 Act, the date of publication need not be included on "pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work[s]" reproduced on certain specified products, which do not include
labels, and on "any useful articles." 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(2) (1992). "Labels" are not considered useful articles. COMPENDIUM, supra note 14, § 1006. Because the copyrighted
matter is reproduced on the label, the date of publication is necessary.
142. In addition, while the Copyright Act of 1976 allowed a single copyright notice
to cover all contributions in a collective work, the Act specifically excluded advertisements from the provision. 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) (1992); see also Canfield v. Ponchatoula
Times, 759 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1985).
143. The "trade dress" of a product may be protected under the Lanham Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1125(a) (1992), if it is inherently distinctive or if it has acquired
distinctiveness through use. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2757
(1992).
144.

See ROGER M. MILGRIM, 2 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS

§

9.05[6][b] (1992)

[hereinafter MILGRIM]; David Bender, Protectionof ComputerPrograms: The Copyright!
Trade Secret Interface, 47 U. PITr. L. REV. 907, 940-45 (1986); Peter A. Luccarelli, Jr.,
The Supremacy of Federal Copyright Law Over State Trade Secret Law for Copyrightable
Computer Programs Marked with a Copyright Notice, 3 COMPUTER/L.J. 19, 50-51 (198 1)
[hereinafter Luccarelli].
145. The argument that affixing a copyright notice should preclude a trade secret
claim has, however, been rejected in a few cases. Technicon Medical Info. Sys. Corp. v.
Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 343, 347 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 687
F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983); M. Bryce & Assocs. v.
Gladstone, 319 N.W.2d 907 (Wis. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982).
146. See, e.g., Princess Fabrics, Inc. v. CHF, Inc., 922 F.2d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1990)
(omission of notice on bolts of fabric); Klauber Brothers, Inc. v. Westchester Lace, Inc.,
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similarly are not susceptible to the easy placement of notice.I47
A notice may be aesthetically undesirable for other artistic
works, such as paintings and sculptures, on which notice may, as a
practical matter, be easily applied. While some problems of placement may be alleviated by regulations of the Register of Copyrights that allow notice to be placed on the back or framing of a
painting or on the base or mounting of a sculptural work,148 artists
have felt that marking their works with a technically accurate notice is oppressive. 149
In circumstances in which the statutory form of notice presents
practical problems, a truncated or modified notice 5 ° should be an
attractive alternative.'5 1 Such a "defective" notice should serve the
same deterrent effect as that served by a valid notice and often
would provide better information to potential licensees for those
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (notice contained only on open end
of each spool of lace); see also supra note 21.
147. See Joan Infarinato, Note, CopyrightProtectionfor Short-Lived Works of Art, 51
FORDHAM L. REVIEW 90, 112 n. 127 (1982) (noting that a short-lived work of art by the
artist Christo consisting of 24.5-mile long nylon cloth was not copyrighted because of the
problem of affixing copyright notice). Forms of art on which placement of a copyright
notice is impractical or incongruous include "installation art," which generally comprises
a staged or decorated gallery room, and "environment art," which involves a planned
three-dimensional space. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ART AND ARTISTS
148, 230 (Ian Chilvers ed., 1990).
148. COMPENDIUM, supra note 14, § 1013.11. The regulations concerned copies of
works the Copyright Office would accept for deposit.
149. See William A. Carleton III, Note, Copyright Royalties for Visual Artists: A Display-Based Alternative to the Droit De Suite, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 510, 528 (1991) (noting that "[s]ome artists may resist the line the regulations implicitly draw between the
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work itself and the mundane or functional accoutrements of the work's display"); Hearings,supra note 48, at 419 (supplementary statement
by Tad Crawford on behalf of the Graphic Artists Guild, the American Society of Magazine Photographers, and the Society of Illustrators in Support of Adherence by the
United States to the Berne Convention) (noting that the "concept of publication does not
easily apply to works of visual art" and that "many artists are unaware of the notice
requirements").
150. Commentators have proposed modified notices for works containing trade
secrets. See Luccarelli, supra note 144, at 51-52 (recommending for works containing
trade secrets the legend "Unpublished - All Rights Reserved Under the Copyright
Laws" to negate a claim of innocent infringement); MILGRIM, supra note 144, § 9.05
[6][b] (recommending alternative notice for trade secret and copyright claims for computer software and data bases). The Copyright Office Compendium specifically provides
that " 'All Rights Reserved' or the like, is not acceptable as an element of the copyright
notice prescribed by U.S. law." COMPENDIUM, supra note 14, § 1005.01(b).
151. For authors of visual art, the Visual Artists Rights Act, effective June 1, 1991,
provides paintings, drawings, prints and sculptures, and limited editions up to 200 copies
thereof, with a form of "moral rights," providing rights of attribution and integrity, if
each limited edition copy is consecutively numbered and signed by the author. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A (1992); see also William A. Tanenbaum, FederalProtection of Moral Rights for
the First Time: The New Visual Artists Rights Act, 3 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2 (1991).
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works whose further reproduction is desirable. For authors faced
with practical burdens in meeting the statutory provisions, alternative notices would provide flexibility as well as many of the same
deterrent and informational functions provided by the technically
accurate notice.
If the copyright notice used does not meet the requirements of
the Copyright Act, there should be only one effect: the copyright
owner cannot conclusively defeat a defense of innocent infringement to mitigate statutory damages to $200. No statutory penalty
exists for using a truncated or technically deficient notice under the
Act as long as it is not fraudulent. 52 Because notice in the statutory form is no longer required to maintain a copyright, any kind
of notice could, in fact, be considered in assessing a defendant's
claim of innocence.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While still a comfortable and cautious means of claiming copyright in a work, the familiar copyright notice is no longer a consideration in ensuring that a work is protected under the copyright
laws. Unfortunately, in eliminating the notice requirement, Congress did not completely abolish the technical provisions governing
its use. Congress's adoption of an evidentiary incentive to encourage the use of a notice presents ambiguities and uncertainties
concerning the lingering utility of the statutorily prescribed notice.
As has been argued in this Article, whether or not the prescribed
notice appears on a work should not affect the determination of a
case governed by the BCIA to any significant degree. Other legal
considerations should also have little effect, at least for works protected in the United States or in Berne Convention countries.
For most authors, the question of whether or in what form they
should use a copyright notice should depend on the practical burdens involved in placing the notice on their works. Incentives in
terms of deterring infringement and providing information to prospective licensees do not necessarily call for the use of the statutorily prescribed notice. Many authors will therefore likely begin
considering alternative notice devices as attractive alternatives to
the technically accurate form of copyright notice.
152. Under 17 U.S.C. § 506(c), one who knowingly uses a notice with false information can be subject to a criminal fine of up to $2,500. False representations in notices or
of ownership have also been found to violate §43(a) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1992); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1982); Sunset Lamp Corp. v. Alsy Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

